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Bates: Unfair Competition in Descriptive Trade-Marks
UNFAIR COMPETITION IN DESCRIPTIVE TRADE-MAKS
I. INTRODUCTION

What is commonly termed a "trade-mark infringement suit" is
an action which is brought for the purpose of enforcing an exclusive
right to the use of a trade-mark, whether founded upon a registered
mark or upon common law rights. When the action cannot be
sustained on the basis of the infringement of a valid technical trademark, the plaintiff may still have a cause of action founded upon
unfair competition.' Since a monopoly in the use of a trade-mark is
permitted only when it has become the absolute and exclusive property of the first user, and since merely descriptive names can never
become such property, the second user of a descriptive trade-maik
becomes an infringer only when he makes unfair use of the mark.2
This note deals with the elements of an action for "trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition" based on the second use of a

mark which is clearly descriptive. The doctrine of generic designation will not be considered. The marks under discussion will be
those whichi were initially invalid as technical trade-marks because
of the inherent disability of descriptiveness.
The Lanham Act 3 defines the term "trade-mark" as including:
• . .any word, name, symbol, or device .or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured
or sold by others.
Descriptive terms fall within this definition as either words or
names, i. e., trade-marks or trade-names. These two terms overlap
to some degree, but there is a difference: A trade-mark applies to
a vendible commodity, a trade-name to a business and its good will. 4
Since the law protects against the appropriation of either upon the
same basic principles, the precise difference is not often material. 5
II. TRADE-MARK INrRINGEM(ENT

A. DIsTINGUISHED FRO UNFAIR COMPrTITION
The entire substantive law of trade-marks is a branch of the broader law of unfair competition.6 Trade-mark infringement involves
1. E. g., House of Westmore v. Denny, 151 F. 2d 261 (3rd Cir. 1945).
2.Fawcett Publications v. Popular Mechanics Co., 80 F. 2d 194 (3rd Cir.
1935).
3.Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 60 STrAT. 427 (1946), 15 U. S. C. §§ 10511127 (1952).
4. American Steel Foundaries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 (1925).
5. Ibid.
6. E.g., House of Westmore v. Denny, 151 F. 2d 261 (3rd Cir. 1945).
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the violation of the exclusive right to use a mark, but unfair competition encompasses any violation of a right arising from the operation
of an established business. 7 The exclusive right to use a trademark has been treated as a property right,8 but the Supreme Court
in Prestonettes,Inc. %r.Coty,9 speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
has said:

A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so
far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of
another's product as his. It does not confer a right to prohibit
the use of the word or'words. It is not a copyright.
These words could well be applied to the use of descriptive terms as
will be seen.
Another distinction has been drawn which is probably just as
important as the determination of rights. The difference between
cases for trade-mark infringement and unfair competition is mainly
a matter of proof, the imitation of a trade-mark raising a conclusive
presumption of fraud, while in unfair competition actual fraud or
misleading of the public, or conduct calculated and intended to mislead it, must be shown by the proofs.' °
B.

VALIDITY O

R.EGISTERED MARKS

Registration of a trade-mark furnishes a strong though rebuttable
presumption of its validity."
Although the Trade-Mark Act of
1946 provides for the registration of trade-marks which are descriptive but which have become "distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce,"12 it also provides that this registration gives "no incontestable right . . . in a mark or trade-name which is the common descriptive name of any article or substance, patented or otherwise."'13 Thus, not only is a descriptive mark invalid as a trademark at common law, but registration does not create any substantive
rights in the user or give him any exclusive use or monopoly.' 4
7. Ibid.
8. Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1924). But see E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917) in which
Justice Holmes states: "The word 'property', as applied to trade-marks ..,
is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary
fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith."

9. 264 U. S. 359 (1924).

10. Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366 (4th Cir. 1904).
11. Pennzoil Co. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 50 F. Supp. 891 (D.
Md. 1943), cert. denied 322 U. S. 750 (1943), aff'd 140 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir.
1944).
12. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1052(f)
(1952).
13. Id. § 1115.
14. Plough, Inc. v. Intercity Oil Co.. 26 F. Supp. 978 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
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Having no statutory remedy for the infringement of a descriptive
mark, the one who uses the term first in its trade-mark sense must
turn to the common law of unfair competition for relief.' 5
III. UNFAIR COMPETITION

It has been said that the elements of unfair competition are fraudulent intent, sale or probable sale by reason of deceit, and damages.'O
Like an octopus, this seemingly simple statement has tentacles reaching out in many different directions. It must be explained and
qualified for almost every new situation, leaving the courts with the
problem of making decisions by applying general rules to the facts
of the individual cases.
A.

SECONDARY MEANING

1. Distinctiveness.Since the Lanham Act accepts descriptive marks
for registration when they acquire distinctiveness, statutory recognition is given to a common law doctrine in unfair competition known
as "secondary meaning".' 7 This doctrine recognizes that a term or
designation may have, in addition to its common or dictionary meaning, a meaning given to it by the user which ".

.

. point[s] dis-

tinctively to the origin or ownership of the commercial article, and
that it be of such a nature as to permit of an exclusive appropriation
by one person. . . ."s The phrase "secondary meaning" does not

mean a rare or subordinate significance, but an added significance
attached to the original meaning of the term and becoming its usual
and primary significance in the market.' 9 It is the use of the term
in this sense by the one who gave it that significance that the law
of unfair competition protects.
2. Acquisition. There is no specified length of time in which a
user may acquire rights based on a secondary meaning. The Lanham Act provides that the Commissioner of Patents may accept
". .. proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use . . . for
• . . five years . . ." as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness for

purposes of registration, 20 but this does not mean that an action
15. See Charlcs Broadway Rouss v. Winchester Co., 300 Fed. 706 (2d Cir.

1924).

16. Wirfs v. D. W. Bosley Co., 20 F. 2d 632 (8th Cir. 1927).
17. See note 12 supra. The Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 33 STAT.

724 (1905),
limited registration to marks used between 1895-1905 and is of little value
in the area of descriptive marks.
18. Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1924).
19. Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432 (D. Neb.
1943), cert. denied 323 U. S. 766 (1944).
20. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1052(f)
(1952).
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cannot be brought for unfair competition before the end of that
period. The doctrine of secondary meaning applies to registered
and unregistered marks alike for the protection against danger or
harm to a person's business as a result of the misleading of prospective customers as to the identity of the goods involved. 21 The
general test for determining when a secondary meaning has been
acquired was stated in the Barton case:22
• . . Time is the usual standard because a natural one but it is

not the exclusive standard. The test of secondary meaning is
whether the trade-mark has become broadly known to the public
as denoting a product of certain origin. . . . The time [may be]
• . . unusually short, due to unusual circumstances ...

It can be safely said that the term "public" as used in this test means
the prospective customer.
3. Rights. When a person has acquired a right in a descriptive
word by giving it a secondary meaning, his right is still not a monopoly or exclusive ownership of the word and is not equal to that
which he would have in a valid technical trade-mark. 23 He is merely
protected from a competitive use by one seeking to pass off his
products as those of the first user of the mark. 24
B. SALE OR PROBABLE SALE
1. Palming Off. The leading case of Elgin National Watch Co.
v. Illinois Watch Case Co.25 states:
. . . the manufacturer of particular goods is entitled to the reputation they have acquired, and the public is entitled to the means
of distinguishing between those and other goods. .

.

.

The

essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one
manufacturer or vendor for those of another.
Many early decisions 2 0 expressed this view which is known as
"passing off" or "palming off"; some going so far as to hold that
unless such palming off is shown, the action fails. 2 7 In 1918 the
21. See Brooks Brothers v. Brooks Clothing of Cal., 60 F. Supp. 442 (S. D.

Cal. 1945), aff'd 158 F. 2d 798, cert. denied 331 U. S. 824 (1947).
22. See Artype, Inc. v. Zapulla, 228 F. 2d 695 (2nd Cir. 1956); Barton v.

Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1924).
23. E. g., Charles Hansen's Laboratory v. Kirk, 12 F. Supp. 361 (E. D. Pa.
1935).

24. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S.
315 (1938).

25. 179 U. S. 665 (1901).
26. E. g., Goodyear India-Rubber v. Goodyear Rubber, 128 U. S. 598 (1888).
27. E. g., Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U. S. 562, 573 (1893).
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United States Supreme Court in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press2 8 expanded the field of unfair competition to grant

an injunction against the unfair use of news articles where passing
or palming off was completely lacking.
2. Aunt Jemima Doctrine. Other decisions have given rise to
different views or "doctrines" on which relief may be given. 2 9 One
of these views is the "Aunt Jemima Doctrine" 30 which asserts that
".. . goods, though different, may be so related as to fall within the
mischief which equity should prevent."31 This was a rejection by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals of an interpretation of the
Trade-Mark Act of 190532 that where there was no competition,

there could be no unfair competition.3 3 This view no longer prevails, and it is rapidly becoming the established rule in most jurisdictions that relief will be granted to restrain unfair practices regardless of the element of competition. 34 The trend is to place the
emphasis upon "unfair" rather than upon "competition".35 The
Aunt Jemina case 3 6 has been said to establish "confusion of source"
as the test for infringement, which Judge Learned Hand in the
Johnson case 3 7 construed as being codified by the Lanham Act.
Whether this test is applicable to descriptive marks may be questionable, but in the opinion of this writer the question is not too important in view of some of the more modern bases for relief. After
all, is there any real difference in saying that a person is trying to
pass off his goods as those of another and saying that a person
is trying to confuse the customer as to the source of the goods? The
end result is the same in either case. A better rule might be to
examine the "commercial effect of the defendant's acts."38
3. Reputation. In Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson30 Judge
Learned Hand recognized an economic interest in a trade-mark outside the field of 't6e'ownIer".id held that the use by another was bor28. 248 U. S. 215,(19181. 1 ;,
29. See AMTDUR, TRADE-MARx LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5-11 (Lanham Act ed.
1948).
30. Aunt Jeminia Mills v, Rigney, 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. denied
245 U. S. 672 (1918).

31. Id.at 409.

32. 33 SvAT. 724 (1905).
33. See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed.
510 (7th Cir. 1912).
34. See Brooks Brothers v. Brooks Clothing of Cal., 10 F. Supp. 442 (S. D.
Cal. 1945), aff'd 158 F.2d 798, cert. denied 331 U. S. 824 (1947).
35. E. g., Bulova Watch Co. v.Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D.Mass. 1947).
36. See note 34 supra.
37. S. C.Johnson & Son v.Johnson, 175 F. 2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949).
38. See Photoplay Publishing Co. v. La Verne Publishing Co., 269 Fed. 730

(3rd Cir. 1921).
39. 26 F. 2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
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rowing the owner's reputation. This view has been followed in
later decisions to some extent. 4 0
4. Expansion. Another basis for curbing the use of a mark is the
"expansion doctrine". This doctrine contemplates the possibility
that the normal expansion of the plaintiff trade-mark owner's business might include the goods to which the mark is being applied
by the defendant, even though such goods are not presently remotely
related to the owner's business; therefore, the defendant's use of
the mark would prevent expansion.4 1
5. Deception. Some courts have held that, under the doctrine of
secondary meaning, the plaintiff must show that the consumer has
actually been deceived, since there can be no injury to the plaintiff
by the use of a descriptive term which is juris publici unless it re"2
sults in the mistaken purchase of the goods because of their name.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals does not seem to require actual
deception, at least as far as a trade-name is concerned, but "[i] t is
sufficient if the natural and probable consequence .. .is to pass off
his [defendant's] business as that of the plaintiff." 4 3 Other circuits
have followed the practice of allowing injunctive relief where probk and one has
able confusion would result from defendant's actions, 44
announced that it was even immaterial that the purchasers were not
deceived. 4 5 The best view seems to be that deception is not confined to an express palming off of goods, and that equity will extend
relief where it is required. 4 6 Lord Herscell's opinion in Reddaway
v. Banham4 7 indicates that the English courts recognized a similar
view before the turn of the century.
40, See, e. g., Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 40 F. Supp. 249 (E. D. Ill. 1941).

41. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. S.

176 (S.Ct. 1937).

42. American Brake Shoe v. Alltex Products, 117 F. 2d 983 (2d Cir. 1941)
American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. 2d 472 (6th Cir. 1942).

43. Little Tavern Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 116 F. 2d 903 (4th Cir. 1941).

44. General Time Instruments Corp. v. United States Time Corp., 165 F.

2d 853 (2d Cir. 1949).
45. Standard Paint Co. v. Rubberoid Roofing Co., 224 Fed. 695 (7th Cir.
1915). In this action for protection from unfair competition in the use of

the descriptive term "Rubberoid" which had acquired a secondary meaning,
the court per Judge Mack said:
"It is immaterial that, in some instances, the purchasers were not in fact
deceived because they were acting on behalf of appellant for the very purpose of
to palm off its goods
securing positive proof of appellee's willingness
as those of appellant."
46. See Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 8 F. Supp. 314 (E. D.
N. Y. 1934), mod. on other grounzds 78 F. 2d 700, cert. denied 296 U. S.648,
rehearingdenied 296 U. S.665 (1935).
47. [18961 A. C. 199, 212.
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C. INTENT
Wrongful or fraudulent intent is presumed in an action on a valid
trade-mark, but in the case of a descriptive mark wrongful intent
in fact, or circumstances that will justify the inference of such intent, must be shown.4 8 The wrongful use itself may be evidence
of intent to defraud.4 9 The court in Coly, Inc. v. Parfurns de
Grande Luxe5O expressed a controversial view which seems to be
a sensible approach per judge Rogers:
We think that the reasons for not requiring proof of a fraudulent intent in cases of infringement of trade-marks apply with
equal force in cases of unfair competition, the basis of the remedy
being substantially the same. . . . [I]t is thought to be the
better view that, where the necessary and probable tendency
of defendant's conduct is to deceive the public and pass off his
goods as and for those of the plaintiff, especially where preventive relief only is sought, actual fraudulent intent need not
be shown.
This view has been given some support by the district court of Maryland in Pox Fur Co. v.Fox Fur Co. saying that if the other elements
of liability were present, "then defendant's motive, except in so far
as it may affect the extent of allowable damages, is immaterial."' '
Just what justice Fuller meant by his statement in the Elgin case 5 2
that "such circumstances must be made out as will show wrongful
intent in fact, or justify that inference from the inevitable consequences of the act complained of" is not clear. But he seems to
have said that where the result of the use of a mark is judicially determined from the circumstances to fall within the area prohibited,
the court will infer a wrongful intent. If this construction is correct,
the result approaches that in the Coty case.
The root of the difficulty in reconciling the views on proof of
intent may well lie in the fact that Federal courts must apply the
common law of the states to unfair competition cases. 5 3 There
48. Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665
(1901) ; see also Iudge Learned Hand's opinion in My-T Fine Corp. v. Samuels,
69 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1934).
49. Standard Oil Co. v.California Peach & Fig Growers, 28 F. 2d 283 (D.
Del. 1928) ; see note 45 sifra.
50. 293 Fed. 865 (2d Cir. 1924). But see Corliss & Co. v.Hershey, 140 Fed.
763, 764 (3rd Cir. 1905).
51. 59 F. Supp. 12 (D. Md.1944).
52. See note 48 supra.
53. The questions of when a Federal court has jurisdiction and whether
or not there is a Federal law of unfair competition are studies within themselves. Very generally: A cause of action for unfair competition may be
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should be no difficulty, however, in accepting the reasoning of Judge
Davis in the Photoplay case: "If the effect is to pass off his defendant's goods for those of the complainant, his good intentions or
honesty of purpose is not a defense." 54
D. Bumin

oF PROOF

In an unfair competition action, just as in a trade-mark infringement suit, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case free from reasonable doubt. 5 5 Where a descriptive
mark is concerned, this means that the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing "secondary meaning". 5 6 It has been said that whether
unfair competition exists is a mixed question of law and fact, 57 but
when descriptiveness is not an issue and injunctive relief is sought
on the basis of an acquired secondary meaning, it is difficult to see
how any question of law is involved. The determination that a
secondary meaning has or has not been acquired must be made upon
the facts of a particular case. 5 8
IV. CONCLUSION

The often quoted Hanover Star case5 9 summarizes the law of unfair competition:
. .. the remedy is to tie the hands of the unfair trader ...
If he [a dealer] has applied . . . a mark . . . that had an exist-

ing meaning, it is incumbent on him to establish the fact that
his trade has added a new meaning that is exclusively appendant
joined in a suit for trade-mark infringement in a Federal court and the jurisdiction over the suit for unfair competition will be retained even if the trademark infringement suit is dismissed. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933) ;
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315
(1938).
Although some writers contend that unfair competition is governed by
Federal law under the Trade-Mark Act of 1946, the Supreme Court has repeatedly followed the view that unfair competition is a matter of state law
since Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). See OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES - TRADE REGULATION § 86 (1950).
54. See Photoplay Publishing Co. v. La Verne Publishing Co., 269 Fed.
730 (3rd Cir. 1921).
55. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Power City Brewery, 28 F. Supp. 740 (W. D.
N. Y. 1939).
56. See Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122
(7th Cir. 1940).
57. Collegiate World Publishing Co. v. Du Pont Publishing Co., 14 F. 2d
1926).
158 (N.D. IIl.
58. Cf. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark, 62 F. Supp.
971 (D. N. J. 1945), aff'd in part & vacated in part on other grounds 157
F. 2d 725, cert. denied 329 U. S. 796 (1946), rehearing denied 329 U. S. 834
(1947).
59. Hanover Star v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 Fed. 513 (7th Cir. 1913).
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to his trade. . . . [TIhe complainant must show that the defendant is using the mark or name, not in its common meaning,
but in its new meaning created by the complainant.
It is the application of this law which gives trouble. To say that
".. .the issue of unfair competition is .. .fraught with less difficulty than that of trade-mark infringement" 60 is possibly inaccurate
when the mark in question is descriptive. The establishment of
the fact that a secondary meaning has been acquired is by no means
a simple task.
The trend in modern times seems to be to widen the limits of protection against unfair competition, but these limits are necessarily
still restrictive in many instances and depend a great deal upon the
facts of the individual case. 61 In the words of Lord Halsbury in
Reddaway v. Banham:62 "For myself, I believe the principle of
law may be very plainly stated, and that is, that nobody has any
right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else." Equity
frowns upon such a practice and will give attention to the needs of
each case as called for by its peculiar factual situation without concerning itself too much with the niceties of rules. As new situations
arise equity will bend to bridge the gaps between established principles and the demands of justice. Tempora mutantur, nos et mutatur
in illis.63
Roy D. BATES.

60. Rosenberg Bros. v. Elliot, 7 F. 2d 962 (3rd Cir. 1925).
61. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. S.

176 (S. Ct. 1937).

62. [1896] A. C. 199, 204.

63. Translated: The times are changed, and we are changed with them. WEsTER's N4Nv COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY (2d ed. 1949).
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